In a hypothetical case, Abraham, a wealthy Jewish businessman, is accused of a tax fraud but he denies the allegations. In his trial, the prosecution seeks to use statistical evidence which had been gathered and analysed with the utmost proficiency. According to these statistics, the probability of a person committing tax fraud is doubled if he is Jewish. The use of such evidence is obviously objectionable. The question is why this evidence should be excluded from court. This paper argues that it is very difficult for efficiency theories of law to provide a good justification for excluding this evidence. In contrast, corrective justice theories (e.g. Weinrib) are better placed to do so. If successful, this argument identifies an advantage of corrective justice theories over their efficiency competitors. It also identifies the limitations of the efficiency theories and highlights that they lead to some problematic consequences in evidence law, consequences which have so far been overlooked.
§1 Introduction
Evidence law has come under much less discussion by the efficiency theorists than other areas of law, such as tort and criminal law -and even criminal and civil procedure. 1 Furthermore, discussion of evidence law has focused mainly on the questions of if and how economic analysis and methods can provide interesting insights into the law of evidence. 2 Very little attention has been given to the corresponding question of whether evidence law can contribute to the debate between efficiency and deontological theories. 3 This paper focuses on the latter question and provides one example of how a problem in evidence law can shed light on this debate. It does so by discussing a challenge which has preoccupied evidence scholarship for many years: the justification for excluding racist statistical evidence from court. Consider the following hypothetical scenarios. Martin, a young black man, is accused of * PHG Foundation Lecturer in Law, Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge. I thank Rhonda Powell, Tal Ofek, and Guy Sela for their comments on previous versions of this paper. 1 For some notable exceptions, see , ch 5; ; . See also Lempert's detailed criticism, . 2 In addition to the general schemes mentioned above (n 1), some interesting attempts have been made to utilise efficiency theories to provide insights into the rule of evidence. See, for example, ; . committing a violent robbery. He denies the allegations. In his trial, the prosecution seeks to use statistical evidence which had been gathered and analysed with the utmost proficiency. According to these statistics, the probability that a young man would commit a violent robbery is tripled if he is Black. Abraham, a wealthy Jewish businessman, is accused of a tax fraud and he also denies the allegations. In his trial, the prosecution seeks to use statistical evidence (again, professionally gathered and analysed), according to which the probability of a person committing tax fraud is doubled if he is Jewish.
In both hypothetical cases, the use of statistical evidence is obviously objectionable. The starting assumption of this paper is therefore that using this type of evidence in court is so absurd that any decent theory about the use of evidence should object to its use in court. The question is why this evidence should be excluded from court. This is a normative question which calls for a justification, not for a mere explanation.
The argument of this paper is that it is very difficult for efficiency theories of law to provide a good justification for the exclusion of this type of statistical evidence.
In contrast, deontological theories of law such as Weinrib's theory of corrective justice are better placed to do so. 4 If successful, this argument identifies an advantage of deontological theories over their efficiency competitors. It also identifies the limitations of the efficiency theories and highlights that they lead to some problematic consequences in evidence law, consequences which have so far been overlooked.
In this paper, the term "racist statistical evidence" refers to evidence about the rate of similar misconduct amongst people of the same race, as exemplified by the scenarios above. It is important to emphasise that this is only a subset of all statistical evidence.
Other types of statistical evidence might be acceptable or also objectionable. The paper focuses on this particular subset because statistical evidence concerning the rate of similar misconduct amongst people of the same race is a paradigmatic example of evidence which should not be used in court. If efficiency theories cannot provide a good justification for its exclusion, not only is this a troubling finding on its own, it is also an indication that efficiency theories might not be able to justify the exclusion of other no less controversial types of statistical evidence.
The argument is established by identifying and rejecting various potential answers which efficiency theories might offer to the question: why should racist 4 .
The answers to the question involve the autonomy and individuality of the litigant against which the statistics is adduced (the most detailed account is that of Wasserman).
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These answers are discussed and shown to have good prospects of providing the sought-after justification. However, they are also shown to be more consistent with deontological than with efficiency theories.
The paper is structured according to the different types of justification which the efficiency theorists might offer. The first part of the paper addresses justifications which are practical in nature. Firstly, efficiency theorists could suggest that the cost of using statistical evidence in court (created by gathering, analysing and presenting it) is higher than the benefit gained from its help to the legal fact-finding. Secondly, efficiency theorists might point to some practical obstacles involved in gathering, analysing, and presenting statistics correctly. In particular, they might emphasise the cognitive biases from which human beings suffer when interpreting and weighing statistical evidence. Based on these practical difficulties, they might argue that racist statistical evidence should not be used in court.
The first part of this paper lists several difficulties with the practical responses.
Firstly, it is shown that supporting these practical justifications with empirical findings is more difficult than it appears. These claims require more than just emphasising that human beings are not very good at dealing with statistics. Secondly, even if there are practical difficulties, excluding the evidence might not be the best solution to respond to them. Instead of excluding this evidence, the efficiency theorists should offer more proactive measures on how to overcome the practical difficulties and make the use of this evidence cost-effective. Finally, it is suggested that these practical responses are insufficient to provide a comprehensive justification.
The problem with using racist statistical evidence is not merely practical. Even if the cost-benefit analysis shows that using this evidence sufficiently helps the fact-finder to justify its costs, surely the efficiency theorists are able to suggest a principled reason why it should not be used. 5 . I critically evaluate his account in .
The Inevitable Efficiency of Racist Statistical Evidence
The second part of the paper moves to the principled answers which efficiency theorists might suggest. It discusses answers which focus on the alleged deficiencies in the evidence itself. First, the efficiency theorists might dismiss the statistical evidence as simply irrelevant to the particular case (and thus using it in court is a waste of resources). However, it is shown that this answer is inconsistent with the concept of relevance as it is used in evidence law, that it leads to counter-intuitive results, and that it begs the question. Second, the efficiency theorists might rely on one of the various accounts which allege that using statistical evidence to reach conclusions about a specific case is epistemologically deficient and thus irrational.
However, not only do these epistemic accounts suffer from some generic problems, they are also particularly unattractive to efficiency theorists.
The paper then turns to potential second-order costs which might be created from the use of racist statistical evidence. The third part of the paper discusses externalised costs which might be imposed on third parties. The efficiency theorists might argue that using racist statistical evidence creates adverse reactions amongst the general public and/or the legal profession and that these adverse reactions create sufficient disutility to outset any benefit from using this evidence. However, this justification is unattractive, particularly in the context of evidence law. There might have been times when the use of some types of credible evidence commonly used nowadays (e.g. fingerprints) also created adverse reactions amongst third parties (the general public and the legal profession). If the rules of evidence were determined according to the public opinion of the day, such evidence might never have been introduced.
The fourth part of the paper discusses second-order costs which are imposed on the litigants themselves. In particular, it focuses on Wasserman's argument that using statistical evidence about misconduct rates amongst other similar people treats the individual litigant as a predetermined mechanism whose behaviour can be learnt from observing other similar mechanisms. Since litigants should be treated as autonomous individuals, Wasserman concludes that this evidence should not be used in court. However, although this account has several merits, it is more consistent with deontological than with efficiency theories. §2 Answers from Practicality §2.1 Costs of Use
When discussing the use of statistical evidence, Brilmayer and Kornhauser claim that:
The admission of technical evidence or the adoption of technological methods favors those with access to experts. In criminal proceedings this advantage tends to create a bias against criminal defendants, in civil proceedings against "small" plaintiffs and defendants.
6
The efficiency theorists do not have to prescribe to Brilmayer and Kornhauser's underlying egalitarian assumptions, but they could adopt a similar line of argument.
They might argue that the cost of gathering, analysing and presenting racist statistical evidence in court is sufficiently high to outset any benefit from using it. These costs are imposed on the litigants and on the public purse, because lawyers, judges and juries have to immerse themselves in the complicated technicalities of statistics. Efficiency theorists might refer to the difficulties in using statistical evidence correctly in order to justify why racist statistical evidence should not be used to determine whether Martin or Abraham committed the alleged crimes.
However, extracting a comprehensive justification from these cognitive biases is more difficult than it might appear. First, to support a justification, one needs to do more than show that there are practical difficulties. One has to show that these cognitive biases render the use of the statistical evidence counter-productive, i.e. to make the fact-finder less likely to discover the truth about Martin and Abraham.
Showing that the fact-finder fails to conform to Kolmogorov axioms of probability and their consequences, 12 which is what some of these difficulties show, 13 is not enough. Using practical difficulties to justify the exclusion of the above statistical evidence requires the efficiency theorists to establish several nontrivial empirical contentions.
9 . For an up-to-date survey of these findings, see , pp. 12 . Two consequences which receive substantial attention are the principle of negation and Bayes' Theorem. The principle of negation says that the probability that a certain event would occur equals the probability of "one minus the probability this event would not occur" (in formal notation, P(E) = 1 -P(¬E)). Rejecting this principle stands at the heart of Jonathan Cohen's controversial theory of Baconian probability, , §53, pp. 177-181. Bayes' Theorem is a simple formula with which the agent should update his prior probabilities in light of new evidence. The literature on these issues is immense. An accessible introduction to Bayesian epistemology can be found in , ch. 4. A good critique of their philosophical foundations can also be found in .
13 n 9.
A particularly difficult empirical contention to establish is that the most costeffective method to overcome the difficulties in using statistical evidence correctly is by not using it at all. Perhaps these cognitive biases may be better overcome by education and training of the legal profession 14 and/or by inviting expert statisticians to assist the legal fact-finder to make the most of this evidence. 15 If the main problem with the racist statistical evidence against Martin and Abraham were merely the difficulties in using it correctly, then the conclusion would not necessarily be that this evidence has to be excluded. Instead, the conclusion may be that the practical difficulties should be overcome in a way which would allow the legal system to make better use of this evidence. Therefore, on their own, the cognitive biases are unable to justify why statistical evidence on the rate of similar misconduct amongst Blacks or Jews should not be used in court.
Last, there is something inherently unsatisfying in responding to the troubling idea of using racist statistical evidence with practical difficulties. The practical difficulties in using statistical evidence correctly are important. But are they really the main problem with using racist statistical evidence about Blacks and Jews? Even if this evidence could be used correctly from a statistician's perspective, surely the efficiency theorists can offer more principled justifications as to why this evidence should not be used in court. The remainder of the essay therefore turns to examine what these principled justifications could be.
§3 Answers from Epistemology
The first type of principled justification which the efficiency theorists could suggest relies on a defect in the racist statistical evidence itself. This part of the paper is divided into two subparts. The first discusses the intuitively appealing response that racist statistical evidence is simply irrelevant to the particular cases of Martin and More recently, Alex Stein has asserted that statistical evidence is unsusceptible to individualised testing. 24 These attempts are grouped here as "the epistemic accounts" because they share the view that making inference from the statistical evidence to the particular case is epistemologically deficient. They all attempt to identify a quality that non-statistical evidence (e.g. eye-witnesses, confessions, the individual's medical records) has, but statistical evidence lacks. The efficiency theorists could resort to any of these accounts and argue that racist statistical evidence should be excluded from court because it is inadequate from an epistemic perspective.
However, resorting to any of the epistemic arguments will not help the efficiency theorists to provide a solid justification for excluding racist statistical evidence. First, each of these accounts has been extensively criticised by both philosophers and lawyers. Each of the epistemic accounts makes interesting philosophical claims and discussing them in depth would make an already lengthy paper too long. 25 However, it is worth noting that these accounts are highly 21 Cohen (n 12).
22 . See also . 23 . A more sophisticated version of this account was recently provided in . Before they could rely on any of these accounts to provide a justification, the efficiency theorists would need to ensure that their chosen epistemic account is actually sustainable.
Second, it is possible to add two generic arguments which show that the epistemic direction is unpromising to the extensive literature about these accounts.
The first argument is that epistemic accounts have general applicability, whilst the statistical evidence is objectionable only when it is used in court. Epistemology questions, inter alia, how a rational agent ought to think and form his rational beliefs.
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If it is epistemologically unwarranted to form a belief using certain irrational methods, then one would expect this epistemic principle to apply regardless of whether the agent is a juror, scientist, or layman. However, such a conclusion goes against too many of our intuitions and practices. The use of statistical evidence about the rate of violent crimes in a certain neighbourhood is strongly objectionable when it is used to convict an individual of committing a violent crime; it is less objectionable when is used to allocate more police forces to patrol this neighbourhood; and it is not objectionable at all when used to determine the budget of the Accident & Emergency department of the local hospital. If the evidence lacked some epistemic quality (as the proponents of the epistemic accounts allege), and if epistemic principles should apply to a rational agent regardless of whether he is a juror, police chief or public-health policy maker, then the difference between the attitudes to statistical evidence in each context cannot be explained or justified. The problem with racist statistical evidence cannot therefore be purely epistemic.
26 Schoeman (n 16). 27 For philosophy, see ; ; and Cohen's response in . For law, see ; .
28 , pp. 968-975.; ; .
The second generic problem with the epistemic accounts is that any restriction of the use of statistical evidence might itself be epistemologically unwarranted. The proponents of the epistemic accounts accept that the use of statistical evidence improves the probability of finding the truth. Cohen argues that statistical evidence lacks weight, but he does not deny that statistical evidence raises the probability that the proposition which the evidence is adduced to establish is true. 31 Thomson argues that high probability is not a sufficient condition for justification, and by that she implies that using statistical evidence raises the probability of the decision being correct (even though it would be less justified, according to her). 32 Dant explicitly accepts that statistical evidence is no worse than non-statistical evidence when it comes to the ability to lead the fact-finder to the truth. 33 Stein supports a requirement of individualised testing, but accepts that general evidence increases the probability of reaching the truth (despite carrying no weight an efficiency perspective to sacrifice accuracy merely in order to satisfy some opaque epistemic criteria? Therefore, efficiency theorists will find little utility in resorting to the epistemic accounts in order to justify why the racist statistical evidence against
Blacks and Jews should not be used in court.
§4 Answers from Legitimacy
Failing to find a solution in epistemology, the efficiency theorists might return to more familiar ground and look for externalised costs which the use of the racist statistical evidence in court imposes on third parties. In particular, they might argue that using this evidence creates adverse reactions amongst the general public and that such reactions create sufficient disutility to outset any accuracy benefit. They could find support for this position in some of the existing objections to the use of statistical evidence in court. For example, Tribe and Nesson have argued that its use collides with the ritualistic functions of the trial, 38 and with the legitimacy and acceptability of the judgment by the public. 39 These accounts are termed 'the legitimacy accounts' because they focus on the legitimacy of the legal system as a social institution. Their justification for restricting the use of statistical evidence is based on adverse institutional effects which the use of statistical evidence creates. The efficiency theorists could utilise the legitimacy accounts to argue that using racist statistical evidence creates disutility amongst third parties, mainly members of the general public. This disutility is composed not only from the immediate adverse reactions (such as anger, frustration, discontent), but also from the long-term risk that the public 37 It could be argued that maintaining these standards creates some satisfaction and thus utility amongst third parties. This issue is discussed in the next section. might lose its trust in the legal system if it used racist statistical evidence to determine the rights and liability of Blacks and Jews. This disutility, so the argument goes, is sufficient to outset any benefit to the accuracy of the legal fact-finding which the use of statistical evidence may have (henceforth, "the answer from legitimacy").
The problem with the answer from legitimacy is that it falls prey to a long list of objections that have been raised against the legitimacy accounts. 40 First, like the legitimacy accounts themselves, 41 this answer relies on some strong assumptions, which need to be established by empirical research. One assumption that they have to establish is that the use of racist statistical evidence will create disutility amongst the general public. This assumption is hard to establish for two reasons. First, it is necessary to establish the existence of actual disutility. The answer from legitimacy does not depend on how members of society should react to the racist statistical evidence, or on how one wishes they had reacted. The justificatory force of this answer completely depends on how members of society actually react to this evidence, as racist or unpleasant as this reaction might be. Second, the argument refers to the aggregative disutility based on the reactions of all members of society.
Pointing to adverse reactions amongst the relevant minority group (or to other groups which would identify with their cause) is not enough. Some members of the society might consider excluding this evidence as hypocritical and/or unfair. Their positive reaction to the use of racist statistical evidence might offset the adverse reactions of other members.
To utilise the legitimacy accounts, the efficiency theorists would have to establish another contentious empirical assumption: that the externalised costs are higher than the benefit of using this evidence. This assumption is also hard to establish. Recall that, according to Koehler and Shaviro's argument (conceded even by those who object to the use of statistical evidence on epistemic grounds, see §3.2 above), using statistical evidence and methods improves the accuracy of legal factfinding.
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To justify the exclusion of racist statistical evidence based on the 40 Shaviro provides an excellent criticism of the legitimacy accounts in . 41 For example, Nesson asserts that verdicts based on statistical evidence are perceived as illegitimate: 'Although the defendant probably caused the plaintiff's injury, the factfinder cannot reach a conclusion that the public will accept as a statement about what happened. … What is crucial in this situation is that the public cannot view whatever statement the factfinder makes as anything other than a bet based on the evidence', Nesson [II], supra 39, p. 1379. However, Shaviro brings various cases where the statistical evidence is not only acceptable to the public, but also excluding it would make the verdict unacceptable (e.g. DNA), Shaviro (n 40), pp. 545-548. 42 Recall also that the practical issues with using statistical evidence correctly are insufficient to establish a proper justification for the exclusion of racist statistical evidence, see §2 above.
externalised costs of third parties, the efficiency theorists would also have to show not only that using racist statistical evidence creates aggregative disutility, but also that this disutility is sufficiently high to outset any contribution which this evidence may make to the accuracy of legal fact-findings.
It should be emphasised that these empirical issues are not raised to show that the cost-benefit analysis must lead to the conclusion that using racist statistical evidence is cost-effective even when the externalised costs are included. The purpose of raising these issues is to highlight how difficult it would be for the efficiency theorists to ground their objection to racist statistical evidence in the externalised costs it creates amongst the general public.
Regardless of the validity of the empirical assumptions, the answer from legitimacy also faces three principled difficulties. First, like the legitimacy accounts themselves, this answer prefers appearance over actual justice.
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The accurate determination of factual matters is important for all theories, utilitarian and deontological alike. More factually-mistaken decisions suggest more unjust decisions (and this seems to be true regardless of one's conception of justice). If statistical evidence improves accuracy (and inter alia if racist statistical evidence improves accuracy), then it should not be excluded from court just because it has a bad press. The answer from legitimacy embodies a problematic preference of an appearance with which the general public feels comfortable over an actual justice in terms of more factually correct decisions. Shaviro concludes his case against the legitimacy accounts by stating that this preference 'suggests that one cares less about the actual existence of injustice than about one's own capacity to achieve peace of mind through wishful thinking'. 44 It 'shows a disturbing preference for illusion over reality and for appearance over substance'. 45 The same can be said on the attempt to justify the exclusion of racist statistical evidence based on third parties' reactions. Evidence rules should be based upon principle and not perception.
Second, even if the main problem with racist statistical evidence were the externalised costs which its use creates for third parties, excluding the evidence would 43 Shaviro (n 40), p. 537 and p. 553. It seems that even Nesson himself, when advocating the explanation of acceptability, realises the vulnerability of his argument to this objection: 'to argue that the search for truth may be compromised in order to enhance the power of the law's substantive message is…to make an argument that is in some sense inherently unsatisfying', Nesson II, supra 39, p. 1391.
44 Shaviro (n 40), p. 537.
45 Shaviro (n 40), p. 553.
still be the wrong course of action. If the justification to exclude accuracy-improving evidence were based on the adverse reactions it creates amongst the general public, then efficiency theorists should tackle the reactions themselves, not the evidence.
They should not agree to the exclusion of accuracy-improving evidence. Instead, they should advocate programmes and reforms which would neutralise these externalised costs by helping the public to overcome its intuitions, biases, and fears.
Last but not least, resorting to the disutility of third parties is particularly unattractive from the perspective of efficiency theories. Although this is a possible strategy to employ, its price should be acknowledged. In particular, it blurs the theoretical distinctiveness and undermines the normative force of the efficiency theories. 46 If a legal rule can be objected to based on the adverse reactions it creates amongst the general public, then this strategy leads to the preservation of inefficient practices just because the public likes them, is used to them, etc. This point is particularly biting because the public perception constantly changes. In the context of 
§5 Answers from Autonomy
An interesting response to the problem of statistical evidence appears in those accounts which focus on the defendant's individuality and autonomy. The most detailed account is that of Wasserman. 47 The purpose of this section is not to evaluate this account in detail, 48 but only to show why it would be difficult for efficiency theorists to rely on it to provide a justification to exclude racist statistical evidence. In contrast, deontological theorists have more theoretical resources to employ Wasserman's account successfully.
46 I thank John Gardner for raising this point with me. 47 . 48 Such an evaluation can be found in .
Wasserman's main thesis is that 'we object to reliance on statistical evidence only when it adds insult to the injury of a false finding of liability', 49 inferred from the way similar people chose to behave. 54 In general, when corrective justice theorists hold an individual at fault, they consider her to be an autonomous agent who can and should be regarded as responsible for her conduct and take ownership of its consequences. 55 Corrective justice theorists can therefore rely on Wasserman's account to justify the exclusion of racist statistical evidence.
The proponents of efficiency theories might also try utilising arguments from autonomy to justify the exclusion of racist statistical evidence. For example, they might argue that demeaning the individual's autonomy is a form of cost which racist statistical evidence imposes on the party against which it is used. However, it is argued here that these sorts of explanations are unpersuasive since resorting to the litigant's individuality and autonomy is incompatible with efficiency theories.
Efficiency theories regard the law as an instrument to maximise social welfare in the society. 56 The legal imposition of liability in a particular case is considered desirable when it improves aggregative social welfare in the long run. 57 In tort law, where these theories are probably most developed, they are future-looking and their interest in compensation is not necessarily for the sake of the victim himself. The accident has already occurred and the question of how the losses should be distributed between the parties is not a question of efficiency but of distributive justice. 58 Efficiency theories impose liability when doing so would affect how future agents will behave. Imposing liability is desirable if and only if the conduct is inefficient, 59 and if imposing liability in the case at hand would deter agents from engaging in a similar activity in the future. Imposing liability is undesirable if it would deter agents from engaging in efficient activity. 60 According to efficiency theories, "fault" is therefore not a moral notion but rather a technical term of tort law. 61 For the purpose of tort law, whether someone is at fault or not should be determined by the (in)efficiency of her conduct, not by its morality.
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Under the efficient theorists' understanding of fault, one cannot justify the exclusion of racist statistical evidence based on the individual's autonomy. The approach of the efficiency theories to individual autonomy differs from that of corrective justice. Efficiency theories clearly assume that individuals have preferences and that they respond to (economic) incentives. 63 If this is all that were included in the individual's autonomy, then these theories would probably accept that individuals should be regarded as autonomous. However, the individual's autonomy in efficiency theories does not have intrinsic value as it does in corrective justice theories (most evidently in Weinrib's theory). For efficiency theories, the agent's autonomy is instrumental, a precondition of responsiveness which is required for the liability rules to achieve their desired effect in guiding the individual in her future conduct. The difference between the two types of theory is most evident in cases in which respecting the autonomy of a particular individual would lead to a reduction in the aggregative social welfare. Corrective justice theories would insist that the individual's autonomy is important enough to be respected even if it requires sacrificing aggregative social welfare. By contrast, theories which focus purely on efficiency would not.
If efficiency is the only consideration which should determine whether imposing legal liability is desirable or not, it is hard to justify a sacrifice in efficiency for the sake of individual autonomy. As autonomy has no intrinsic value in efficiency theories, autonomy considerations will not trump efficiency considerations. This 60 If the conduct does not affect efficiency or if imposing liability would not change the behaviour of agents in the future, the efficiency theories would probably not be interested in the question as to whether imposing liability is desirable or not.
61 'The negligence rule is said to be fault-based because liability is found only if the injurer was at fault in the sense of having been found negligent', Shavell (n 57), p. 180.
62 See Posner, who regards justice as 'defined in terms of economic efficiency', Posner (n 58). 63 '… the view taken will generally be that actors are "rational." That is, they are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their expected utility', Shavell (n 57), p. 1. And 'economic analysis gives much greater weight than other approaches to the view that actors are rational, acting with a view toward the possible consequences of their choices', ibid¸ p. 4.
means that, according to the efficiency theories, as long as statistical evidence promotes accuracy (and thus efficiency), it should be used even if it fails to regard the individual as autonomous. Efficiency theorists are therefore left with no means to object to the use of racist statistical evidence in court.
